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My proposed legislation. . .calls upon the Congress to delegate 
significant new negotiating authorities to the executive branch.  For 
several decades now, both the Congress and the President have 
recognized that trade policy is one field in which such delegations 
are indispensable…the questions which remain concern the degree 
of delegation which is appropriate and the conditions under which 
it should be carried out. 
President Richard M. Nixon1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2015, President Barack Obama signed legislation 
to reauthorize the Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”) and the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 
 
 1  Richard M. Nixon, President, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Trade 
Reform Legislation (Apr. 10, 1973), available at American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3800.  
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2015 (“TPA-2015” or “the Legislation”), about two and a half 
months after the bills were introduced in the House and the Senate, 
and eight years after they expired in 2007.2  On June 24, 2015, the 
Legislation passed the House by a vote of 218 to 206, and 
subsequently the Senate, sixty to thirty-eight, with thirteen 
Democrats joining all but five Republicans.3  The TPA, previously 
known as “fast-track authority” until it was renamed in 2002, refers 
to “[the] authority of the U.S. president to negotiate international 
agreements that Congress can approve or disapprove, but not 
amend or filibuster.”4  It re-establishes an expedited legislative 
process for presidents to submit trade deals to Congress.  The TPA 
was last renewed under the Trade Act of 2002 during the George W. 
Bush Administration.5  Until it expired on July 1, 2007, eleven Free 
Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) had been implemented during the 
tenure of a Republican president and a Democratic president.6  
 
 2  David Nakamura, In Bipartisan Ceremony, Obama Signs Trade Legislation, Calls for 
Infrastructure Bill, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/29/in-bipartisan-
ceremony-obama-signs-trade-legislation-calls-for-infrastructure-bill; Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities And Accountability, Pub L. 114-26 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 4201-4210 (2016)) (referred to as TPA-2015); see also H.R. 1890, 114th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2015); S. 995, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).  See Press Release, United States Senate 
Comm. on Fin., Hatch, Wyden and Ryan Introduce Trade Promotion Authority 
Legislation (Apr. 16, 2015) available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=7701eb50-a0ef-
4257-bfc1-b06efe725b8c; Jonathan Weisman, Deal Reached on Fast-Track Authority for 
Obama on Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/business/obama-trade-legislation-fast-track-
authority-trans-pacific-partnership.html?_r=0 (announcing that “key congressional 
leaders” agreed to give President Obama trade promotional authority and outlining 
the consequences of passing the new bill). 
 3  Jonathan Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 24, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/trade-
pact-senate-vote-obama.html?_r=0.  
 4  John Remensperger, What’s the Deal with Fast-Track Authority?, UNC CTR. FOR 
MEDIA L. & POL’Y (Feb. 7, 2014), https://medialaw.unc.edu/2014/02/whats-the-deal-
with-fast-track-authority/ (explaining the potential effect of fast-track authority in 
future trade negotiations). 
 5  Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805 (2002) (referred to as the “2002 
Trade Act”).  The Trade Promotion Authority in the 2002 Act is found in its Title XXI 
under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority.  See Trade Act of 2002, H.R. 3009, 
107th Cong. § 2101(a) (2002).   
 6  See NICHOLAS BAYNE & STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, THE NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: 
DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 50 (3d ed. 
2012) (explaining that the TPA was given out “reluctantly,” and President Obama does 
not have it at all, since it ran out in 2007).  This Article adopts the official World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) definition of PTAs, but the PTAs are also commonly referred to 
as Free Trade Agreements and Regional Free Trade Agreements (“RTAs”).  See generally, 
Scope of RTAs, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available  at 
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Despite its historical status, reviving the TPA has been more 
controversial and difficult in recent years; for example, a bill to 
renew the expired TPA was introduced in January 2014, but it never 
became law.7  Fifteen months later, the 114th Congress was faced 
with the choice of  whether the TPA is a “Genie in the Lamp” that 
must be kept bottled up,  or whether it should be renwed in order 
to facilitate the negotiation and the implementation of pending 
Preferential Trade Agreements.  From an administrative law point of 
view, the important consideration was if Congress chose to renew 
the TPA, what should it do to ensure that its delegation to the 
executive branch is properly accounted for, including securing the 
congressional role in ever evolving U.S. trade policy. 
This Article proceeds under the premise that the renewal of the 
TPA was a necessary legislative decision for securing congressional 
involvement in the trade negotiation process, and for successfully 
concluding pending trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”) and the bilateral trade agreement with the 
European Union, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (“TTIP”).  Part I.A provides a brief overview of the 
doctrinal framework of the TPA, and its constitutional basis as a 
unique political mechanism in the United States.  Part I.B illustrates 
the significance of the TPA in the context of trade negotiations, and 
differentiates the procedural versus substantive aspects of the TPA.  
 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm (last visited May 18, 
2016) (defining RTAs as reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners, 
including free trade agreements and customs unions).  See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF 
CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 21 (2015) (listing negotiations concluded under TPA granted 
under the Trade Act of 2002, which are: the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile 
(2003); Singapore (2003); Australia (2004); Morocco (2004); [Bahrain (2004)]; 
Dominican Republic-Central America (2005); Monaco (2006); Peru (2007); Colombia 
(2011); Korea (2011); and Panama (2011)).  Of these eleven, the three FTAs enacted 
after 2007—Colombia, South Korea, and Panama—were signed before the expiry date 
under the George W. Bush administration, although President Obama enacted them 
into law.  See also DAVID M. OLSON, Multilateral Negotiations in American Trade Policy: 
Free Trade Agreements from Bush to Obama, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND 
DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE INTERMESTIC POLITICS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 49, 65 (Oluf 
Langhelle ed., 1st ed. 2014) (describing the Obama Administration’s actions to 
“renegotiate . . . pending agreements (Panama, South Korea, and Colombia) to be able 
to submit them for congressional approval”).  
 7  Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014 (“BCTPA”), H.R. 3830, 
113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2013); see Press Release, United States Senate Comm. on Fin., 
Baucus, Hatch, Camp Unveil Bill to Bring Home Job-Creating Trade Agreements (Jan. 
9, 2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=7cd1c188-
87f1-4a0b-8856-3fc139121ca9 (explaining the purpose and significance of the TPA 
legislation).  
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Part II explains how the TPA evolved in U.S. trade policy since it was 
first introduced as the fast-track authority.  This historical account 
will show that the TPA, as a congressional-executive agreement, 
requires Congress’s watch over how the president exercises the 
delegated power by revisiting the political situation that demanded 
the institution of procedural requirements in the 1970s, standards 
that became the foundation of the modern TPA.  Part III engages in 
an in-depth analysis of the congressional oversight mechanisms of 
the TPA, examining its evolution from the Trade Act of 2002 to the 
recent TPA-2015.  Here, the new procedural requirements and 
legislative tools implemented in the TPA-2015 are described, and 
their merits, such as ensuring democratic but efficient engagement 
with the executive branch, are evaluated. 
Shifting gears, Part IV navigates potential limitations and 
administrative law concerns regarding the TPA from a judicial point 
of view.  This Part contemplates a scenario in which the executive 
branch breaches the procedural requirements prescribed by the TPA, 
and whether Congress would be able to resort to appropriate 
judicial remedies in a court of law.  Finally, the Article concludes by 
emphasizing that the new administration, whichever it may be 
upon the presidential election in November 2016, should ensure an 
inter-branch cooperation between Congress and the executive 
branch in exercising the TPA authority, in order to provide 
transparency and accountability, which the TPA-2015 has set out to 
do. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TPA 
A. What is the TPA? 
The TPA is a political mechanism through which Congress 
delegates its authority to the president for the purpose of negotiating 
and entering into certain PTAs.8  Through an expedited set of 
legislative procedures, and in conjunction with extensive 
congressional consultations, the president can submit trade 
agreements to Congress for an up-or-down vote.9  In exchange for 
 
 8  See infra Part I.B for an in-depth description of the TPA (outlining the source 
and inception of fast-track authority).  
 9  J.F. HORNBACK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE 
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 1 (2011); Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA): What is TPA? COAL. SERV. INDUS. 
https://servicescoalition.org/services-issues/trade-promotion-authority-tpa (last visited 
May 18, 2016) (“TPA helps create a strategic framework for U.S. trade policy and 
establishes a critical relationship between the President and Congress in order to 
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this authority, the executive branch is required to provide various 
notices, consultations, and reports to Congress on the progress of a 
trade agreement under negotiation, to ensure Congress’s influence 
over such agreements.10  Throughout this Article, these procedures 
will collectively be referred to as “congressional oversight 
mechanisms.”11  As an ex-ante congressional-executive agreement, 
the TPA creates a symbiotic relationship within both branches’ 
constitutionally vested authorities. 12  Indeed, it is a creative and 
practical political compact between the president and Congress, 
designed to adapt to the increasingly complex nature of PTA 
negotiations.13 
i. Significance of the TPA vis-à-vis Trade Negotiations 
In the sphere of trade agreement negotiations, the TPA is often 
viewed as a necessary tool for enhancing the United States’ 
credibility when its representatives sit at a negotiation table with 
their counterparts.  In the context of trade diplomacy, the following 
expectations exist: (1) that the United States would be able to 
guarantee the negotiated terms that were discussed at a negotiating 
table, and (2) that the final agreements will be given timely and 
 
pursue trade negotiations.”).  
 10  COAL. SERV. INDUS., supra note 9; see generally, White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Office of the United States Trade Rep. (June 
2013), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-
sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (hereinafter 2007 GAO 
REPORT), GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ANALYSIS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND 
CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 
33 (2007).  
 11  See infra Part I.A. for further discussion on the significance of congressional 
oversight in the context of TPA.  
 12  See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & R. CHUCK MASON, Congressional Oversight and Related 
Issues Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States, in 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW, A MANUAL AND SELECT DEVELOPMENTS 189, 192 
(2010) (explaining that Congressional authorization takes the form of a statute passed 
by a majority of both Houses of Congress unlike treaties, where only the Senate plays 
a role in authorization).  For an overview of the political context in which the TPA was 
born, see generally, I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (4th ed. 2005) (describing 
political reasons and factors behind U.S. trade policy for the past fifty years, and 
recounting how fast-track authority evolved over time). 
 13  In the international trade world, the phenomenon of countries engaging in 
complex chains of various PTAs has been described as the “Spaghetti Bowl Effect,” 
first coined by Professor Jagdish Bhagwati. See generally Jagish N. Bhagwati,  U.S. Trade 
Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs 4-9 (Colum. Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper, 
Paper Series No. 726), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15619 
(1995) (describing problems with preferential trading arrangements, such as 
increasing “arbitrary and nonsensical” operation of trade policies).   
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unamended consideration.14  Especially in complex plurilateral 
trade negotiations, any withdrawal from, or amendment of, 
concessions promised by a member state can upset its negotiation 
efforts.  President Obama and the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (“USTR”) have publicly spoken on the importance 
of the TPA for concluding ambitious PTAs that are currently under 
negotiations.15  As of April 2016, the closest conclusion on the 
horizon is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), which intends to 
expand trade and investment with eleven other countries in the  
Asia-Pacific area.  While the TPP was signed on February 4, 2016, 
after more than five years of negotiations, it has not yet entered into 
force.  Other major trade agreements under discussion include the 
TTIP with the European Union (“E.U.”), which recently concluded 
its twelfth round of negotiation, and the Trade in Services Agreement 
(“TISA”), a proposed international trade treaty among twenty-three 
parties with an aim of liberalizing the worldwide trade of services, 
such as banking, health care, and transport.16  In spite of the 
 
 14  See What is Fast Track? Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., available at 
http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/FastTrack/what.html (last visited May 18, 2016) 
(“[U]ltimately, fast track gives the President credibility to negotiate tough trade deals, 
while ensuring Congress a central role before, during and after negotiations.”).  
Supporters of the TPA legislation include private sector and trade associations, 
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
Boeing, Pfizer, and Walmart.  Such major corporations have aggressively lobbied for 
the authority to be granted, since the last TPA bill was introduced in January 2014.  See, 
e.g., Brian Wingfield et al., Congressional Deal Reached on Obama Trade-Talks Authority, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-
09/congressional-deal-reached-on-obama-trade-negotiating-powers (explaining that a 
coalition of approximately 160 groups support the legislation). 
 15  See, e.g., Michael Froman, Ambassador and U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks 
at the U.S. Conference of Mayors (Jan. 21, 2015) (“America has always been strongest 
when it speaks with one voice, and that’s exactly what Trade Promotion Authority, or 
TPA, helps us to do.”).  
 16  Trade policy experts have opined on how the role and timing of the TPA would 
be crucial for the passage and implementation of the TPP.  See, e.g., IAN F. FERGUSSON 
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 50 (2015).  Press Release, Office of the United 
States Trade Rep., Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ Statement (Feb. 4, 2016), 
available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2016/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement.  The twelfth round of the TTIP 
negotiations was conducted from February 22-26, 2016 in Brussels, Belgium, focusing 
on market access, regulatory cooperation, and rules issues.  See Ignacio Garcia Bercero, 
E.U. Chief Negotiator, Statement by the EU Chief Negotiator on the 12th TTIP 
Negotiation Round, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/154325.htm.  
For discussion of previous presidents’ and the private sector’s views of the TPA’s 
advantages, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: 
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J. L. & POLITICS 
345, 345–346 (2003) (explaining that President George W. Bush and President Bill 
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unpredictable political climate, when the United States further 
engages in the TTIP and the TISA, former Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice stated that the TPA will remain “a critical tool in 
the conduct of U.S. diplomacy.”17 
ii. Substantive vs. Procedural Aspects of the TPA 
Trade agreements are often criticized for their impact on 
sensitive political and economic issues in the U.S. domestic sphere, 
such as labor and the environment.  As such, the TPA has most 
frequently been debated on the substantive matters of Congress’s 
negotiating objectives.18  For many, the TPA-2015 discussion 
revolves around the expanded scope of its non-traditional trade 
negotiating objectives, such as currency manipulation and the State-
Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises.19  While it is difficult to 
separate the TPA dialogue into a binary of substantive versus 
procedural issues, this Article focuses on the procedural aspects, 
namely the congressional oversight mechanisms that will drive the 
conversation on the degree of accountability that should be required 
of the executive branch.  In its design, these oversight mechanisms 
will ensure that the executive branch does not receive a “carte 
 
Clinton both set the TPA as their top legislative priorities for free trade agreements).  
See also Jasmin Farrier, CONGRESSIONAL AMBIVALENCE: THE POLITICAL BURDENS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 85 (2010) (citing President Nixon’s Special Message to the 
Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation in April 1973: “[F]or several decades 
now, both the Congress and the President have recognized that trade policy is one field 
in which such delegations are indispensable.”).  Trade in Services Agreement, OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., available at https://ustr.gov/TiSA (summarizing the 
launch of the TISA and its likely financial impact in the services trade) (last visited May 
18, 2016). 
 17  See Condoleezza Rice, Give Obama Trade-Promotion Authority, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (June 5, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/restore-
americas-standing-through-trade/2015/06/05/4a28af42-0b77-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d 
44e_story.html. 
 18  See, e.g., Eli J. Kirschner, Fast Track Authority and Its Implication for Labor Protection 
in Free Trade Agreements, 44 Cornell INT’L L.J. 385, 394 (asserting that “perhaps the most 
important tool that Congress has for controlling the contents of trade agreements 
negotiated under fast track authority is its ability to set negotiating objectives within 
the TPA legislation”). 
 19  A famous example of how a negotiating objective can thwart renewal of fast-
track authority is illustrated in President Bill Clinton’s inclusion of labor and 
environmental issues in side agreements to North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”).  See C. O’Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: 
Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L & ECON. 2 (1994).  See also, 
Alisa DiCaprio, Are Labor Provisions Protectionist?: Evidence from Nine-Labor-Augmented 
U.S. Trade Agreements, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (arguing that the inclusion of “non-
trade” provisions like labor and environment were one of the main reasons that the 
fast-track legislation lapsed for an extended period from 1994 until 2002).  
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blanche” delegation.20  As this Article examines more closely in Part 
III below, the TPA-2015 arguably enhanced the congressional rein 
over the executive branch’s exercise of the delegated authority 
through the new consultation and reporting requirements. 
B. Doctrinal Framework for the TPA: Presidential and 
Congressional Powers 
As Hal Shapiro has noted, the TPA is “a peculiarly American 
institution, reflecting the unique challenge of making trade policy 
in a system where power is divided between the Executive and 
Legislative Branches.”21  Indeed, the TPA is a unique compromise 
and solution to a decades-old debate between Congress and the 
executive branch on how best to carry out the United States’ 
international trade policy objectives through means of trade 
agreements.  This is in sharp contrast to most of the United States’ 
foreign counterparts, where approval of trade agreements is fairly 
straightforward, especially in countries with a parliamentary 
governance system, which is led by the prime minister, the leader of 
the majority party in the legislature.  For example, in Canada, the 
ratification process is wholly controlled by the executive, although 
Parliament has had an ad hoc involvement, which is not 
constitutionally mandated.22 
To understand why the TPA is an inherently fragile political 
compact, examining its constitutional basis is helpful.  As is well 
known, the separation of powers is a fundamental political doctrine 
embodied in the Constitution, which confers different powers to the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the U.S. government.  
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the president exclusive 
authority to negotiate international agreements and treaties, and to 
conduct foreign affairs. 23  When the president negotiates a trade 
agreement that requires changes in U.S. tariffs or other domestic 
laws, however, such agreement is subject to approval by the Senate’s 
 
 20  See Hal Shapiro & Natalie R. Minster, Fast Track Procedures: Do They Infringe Upon 
Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 107 (1995).  
 21  HAL SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 92 (2006).  
 22  Laura Barnett, Canada’s Approach to the Treaty-Making Process, PARL. OF CANADA 
(Nov 6, 2012), available at http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications 
/2008-45-e.htm#a6.  
 23  See JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE 
AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN AS 
TREATIES 1 n.1 (2010) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 319 
(1936)).  
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two-thirds super majority vote.24  As for Congress, Article I, Section 
8, Clauses 1 and 3 of the Constitution give exclusive power to set 
tariffs, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to enact 
other legislation governing international trade.25  An interesting 
caveat to this authority is that this express power can be delegated 
to the president.26  This institutional flexibility creates an 
opportunity for the Congress to consider congressional-executive 
agreements, as opposed to Article II treaties, allowing for inter-
branch cooperation in the form of the TPA without depriving either 
branch of its constitutionally enumerated powers.27 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TPA: FROM FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY TO THE 
TPA 
A. Inception of Fast-Track Authority: A Political Tug-of-War 
For the first 150 years of the United States’ existence, Congress 
used its power over foreign trade to set tariff rates on all imported 
products.28  The Constitution permits this practice, as the 
establishment of tariff rates was more a function of domestic tax 
policy rather than foreign affairs, based in large part on Congress’s 
power to regulate foreign commerce and the conventional treatment 
of trade legislation as a bill for raising revenue.29  However, two 
legislative events occurred in the 1930s that dramatically changed 
the contours of U.S. trade policy.  As a result of these occurrences, 
the fast-track authority was born. 
At the outset of the Great Depression, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act of 1930 established prohibitively high tariff rates in response to 
U.S. producers seeking protection.30  As a remedial measure, 
 
 24  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
 25  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cls. 1 & 3.  
 26  See DESTLER, supra note 12, at 2 n.2.  
 27  There has been lively scholarly debate on whether congressional-executive 
agreements are more advantageous than treaties.  See John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article 
II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
2, 2–4 (arguing that treaties and congressional-executive agreements have different 
“trade-offs” that “make one or the other better suited for different types of pacts”).  
 28  FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 2. 
 29  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 2 (establishing the power of the Congress, which 
includes: “power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises[;]” and, power to 
“regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”).  
 30  Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1352 (2016) (enacted on June 17, 
1930).  While economists debate possible causes for the Great Depression, the Smoot-
Hawley tariff certainly played an important role.  See, e.g., Bill Krist, Did the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Cause the Great Depression? AM. TRADE POL’Y (June 16, 2014), available at 
http://americastradepolicy.com/did-the-smoot-hawley-tariff-cause-the-great-
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Congress developed and enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 (“1934 Trade Act”), which authorized President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to enter into reciprocal trade agreements and 
reduce tariffs within pre-approved levels.  This was the first time 
Congress granted the president power to negotiate bilateral trade 
agreements without receiving prior congressional approval.31  Some 
argue that the 1934 Trade Act signified Congress’s aim to lessen the 
political pressure from special interests it often faced.32  Whether or 
not that was the intention of Congress, what is clear is that from its 
inception, fast-track authority has been contentious due to its fragile 
nature as a political compact between the Administration, the 
House, and the Senate, requiring a significant “give-and-take” by 
and between these three groups.  This concern is evidenced by a 
statement by Representative Allen Treadway of Massachusetts, the 
ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee at the time, 
who opposed the 1934 Trade Act: “[Congress] would surrender [its] 
taxing power to the President and his subordinates in violation of 
both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”33  To this day, the 
concern of balancing the authority of the executive and the 
legislative branch remains highly relevant in every subsequent fast-
track renewal discussion. 
B. Historical Concerns over Presidential Abuse of Fast-Track 
Authority 
Presidents seeking fast-track authority from Congress have 
underscored its necessity to successfully conclude international 
trade negotiations for the benefit of Americans.  For instance, under 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, President John F. Kennedy was 
granted fast-track authority for five years for the negotiation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) that aimed to 
reduce and eliminate tariff walls, which he called “the best 
protection possible . . . for our American consumers.”34  When 
 
depression/#.VU27e0v0-Ns (“Today, the Smoot-Hawley tariffs represent a cautionary 
tale.”). 
 31  19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2016) (enacted on Jun. 12, 1934). The Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act of 1934, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, 
http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/36918 (last visited May 5, 2015). 
 32  DESTLER, supra note 12, at 14–15.  
 33  HORNBACK & COOPER, supra note 9 (adding that to assuage such concerns, the 
bill leading to the Trade Act of 1934 was amended with a three-year expiration date on 
all trade agreements).  
 34  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (2016) (referred to as the “1962 
Trade Expansion Act”); John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Remarks Upon 
Signing the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (Oct. 11, 1962), available at 
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asking Congress for fast-track authority, President Kennedy sought 
“two basic kinds of tariff-cutting authority”: (1) “[g]eneral authority 
to reduce tariffs by 50 percent—including negotiations on broad 
categories of products—in exchange for concessions from other 
nations”; and (2) “special authority to reduce or eliminate all tariffs 
on those products where the United States and the Common Market 
nations dominate world trade.”35 
In retrospect, some scholars have observed that in the effort to 
implement multilateral agreements, the series of fast-track 
extensions resulted in the “pendulum in the arena of international 
trade [t]o sw[i]ng toward the President,” going beyond the topics 
covered by the congressional trade agreements authority.36  For 
example, President Kennedy entered into agreements in two areas 
related to non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”), namely the GATT Anti-
dumping Code that would have required changes in U.S. anti-
dumping practices, and an agreement requiring U.S. customs 
valuation to eliminate the American Selling Price method of pricing 
products at the border.37  Such action arguably undermined the 
limitations imposed by the sunset provisions within the 1962 Trade 
Expansion Act.  While the Kennedy Round, as it was called, 
successfully concluded on June 30, 1967, the last day before the 
expiration of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, Congress did not renew 
the authority for seven subsequent years, as it was concerned over 
“presidential encroachment on its legislative authority.”38 
 
 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8946.   
 35  Morris K. Udall, Congressman’s Report: The Trade Expansion Act of 1962: A Bold 
New Instrument of American Policy (May 17, 1962), available at 
http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/udall/congrept/87th/620517.html.  
36    Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 
29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687, 698 (1996). 
 37  Carrier, supra note 36, at 697.  See also Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls 
on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1,191, 1,195 (1986); I.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION 6 (1997). 
 38  For discussion on the importance of sunset provisions within fast-track 
authority, see infra Part III; see John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1967) (noting that 
the GATT was not submitted to the Senate to be ratified); WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF 
CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 4 (2014); see also John Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo 
Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, 346–
51 (1982) (observing that the reason for the unwillingness of Congress to grant the 
president advance authority to negotiate, accept, and implement the new trade 
agreements stemmed from addressing the “increasingly troublesome [NTBs] in the 
GATT negotiations”); see also Koh, supra note 37, at 1,194 n.10. 
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C. Creation of Modern Fast-Track Authority: the Trade Act of 
1974 
The result of the Kennedy Round became the precursor to the 
creation of fast-track authority in the Trade Act of 1974 (the “1974 
Trade Act”), which expanded the congressional role in defining 
terms for allowing expedited legislative procedures.39 The 1974 
Trade Act provided President Nixon with authority to negotiate the 
NTBs, such as government procurement practices, customs 
regulations, and rules for administering anti-dumping (“AD”) and 
countervailing duty (“CVD”) procedures, as well as the U.S. 
Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) for a 5-year Tokyo 
Round of GATT through January 2, 1980.40  The original fast-track 
processes that the 1974 Trade Act instituted became the foundation 
for the current TPA.  Notably, section 151 the 1974 Trade Act (19 
U.S.C. § 2191) strengthened congressional oversight by 
implementing the following key features. 
i. Implementation of Procedural Requirements 
The 1974 Trade Act incorporated procedural requirements that 
the executive branch must follow, such as briefing and consulting 
congressional committees and private-sector advisory committees 
during the course of the negotiations, as well as giving advance 
notice of the president’s intention to conclude an agreement before 
entering into it.41  With respect to the briefing requirement, the 1974 
Trade Act stated that the USTR is required to keep official advisers 
of the Committee on Ways and Means or the Finance Committee 
(“congressional advisers”) currently informed on matters affecting 
the trade policy and with respect to possible agreements: 
negotiating objectives, the status of negotiations in progress, and the 
nature of any changes in domestic law or the administration thereof 
which may be recommended to Congress to carry out any trade 
agreement or any requirement of, amendment to, or recommendation 
under, such agreement.42 
 
 39  19 U.S.C. §§ 2010–2476 (2016) (referred to as the “1974 Trade Act”). 
 40  DEANNA TANNER OKUN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS: EFFECT OF THE 
TOYKO ROUND, U.S.-ISRAEL FTA, U.S.-CANADA FTA, NAFTA, AND THE URUGUAY ROUND ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY 8 (2003). 
 41  E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2152 (2016) (Advice from Departments and Other Sources); 
Id. § 2155 (Advice from Private Sector); Id. § 2212 (Transmission of Agreements to 
Congress).  DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 7 (explaining 
that in 1974, the agreement to which fast-track authority applied was the recently 
initiated multilateral Tokyo Round for GATT). 
 42  19 U.S.C. § 2211 (b)(1)-(3) (2016).  
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ii. Establishment of Timeline. 
Second, the 1974 Trade Act included a deadline date for 
conclusion of the agreements to which fast-track authority 
applied.43  In addition to the briefing requirement, Congress 
required the executive branch to notify congress ninety calendar 
days before signing an agreement.44  Another essential requirement 
was to establish a timetable resulting in an expedited vote by each 
chamber of Congress within sixty legislative days with no 
amendments allowed.45 As will be shown later in this Article, this 
timeline requirement has become more sophisticated with different 
notification requirements. 
iii. Substantive Monitoring Requirement. 
Furthermore, Congress implemented the monitoring and 
consultation component by requiring the USTR to consult with the 
Ways and Means Committee in the House, and the Senate Finance 
Committee and other appropriate committees, on a “continuing 
basis,” on the “development, implementation, and administration 
of overall trade policy,” including, but not limited to, the following 
elements of such policy: 
• The principal multilateral and bilateral negotiating 
objectives and the progress being made toward their 
achievement; 
• The implementation, administration, and effectiveness of 
recently concluded multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements and resolution of trade disputes; 
• The actions taken, and proposed to be taken, under the 
trade laws of the United States and the effectiveness, or 
anticipated effectiveness, of such actions in achieving trade 
policy objectives; and 
• The important developments and issues in other areas of 
trade for which there must be developed a proper policy 
response.46 
Furthermore, the 1974 Trade Act included rules concerning 
presidential submission of the negotiated agreement to Congress, 
combined with the draft of a proposed implementing bill and 
 
 43  DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 8.  
 44  19 U.S.C. § 2112 (e)(1) (2016).  
 45  DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 8 (emphasis 
added).  
 46  19 U.S.C. § 2211 (c) (1)-(4) (2016).  
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supporting documentation as would be specified in the authorizing 
legislation. 
iv. Guarantee of Agreed upon Content; Up-Or-Down-
Vote. 
Finally, the 1974 Trade Act created expedited legislative 
procedures which limited debate, especially in the Senate.  When 
the president formally introduced the implementing bill to both 
houses of Congress, Congress would either approve or disapprove 
on the day the president submitted it, in the form in which it was 
presented to Congress, with the language unamended.  This 
procedural requirement, commonly referred to as the “up-or-down 
vote,” became the crux of fast-track authority.47 
While the expedited legislative procedures have not changed 
since first enacted in 1974, how Congress built upon the safeguard 
measures first introduced in the Trade Act of 1974 in recent forms 
of the TPA remains highly relevant.48  Part III examines the evolution 
of the congressional oversight mechanism in the 2002 Trade Act, the 
predecessor to the recently passed TPA-2015, and highlights 
noteworthy procedural changes. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: BEYOND THE 2002 TRADE ACT 
This Part compares and contrasts the 2002 Trade Act, the last 
legislation that extended the TPA, with the new TPA mechanism 
introduced by the TPA-2015.  With an overview of the significance 
of oversight features in Part III.A, Parts III. B and C revisit the 
effectiveness of the congressional oversight embedded in the 2002 
Trade Act.  Part III.D discusses the merits of the new elements in the 
TPA-2015, and offers a comment on potential concerns arising from 




 47  Procedurally, this guarantee of an “up-or-down vote” on the implementation of 
legislation is seen as the real advantage of fast-track for the president.  See Steve 
Charnovitz, Fast-Track: A Legal, Historical, and Political Analysis, J. INT’L ECON. L. 10(1) 
153, 155–56 (book review) (agreeing with Hal Shapiro that “fast-track prevents 
Congress from amending an agreement, from filibustering it, from bottling it up in 
committee, or from otherwise engaging in delaying or other tactics to frustrate an up-
or-down vote”). 
 48  FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that the initial grant of fast track trade 
negotiating authority and the authority to enact tariff modifications by proclamation 
under the 1974 Trade Act were in effect for five years until January 2, 1980).  
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A. Principles and Purpose of Congressional Oversight in the 
Context of the TPA 
For the purposes of this discussion, the term “congressional 
oversight,” encompasses “the review, monitoring, and supervision” 
of the president and the USTR’s trade negotiation activities.49  The 
philosophical underpinning for congressional oversight is found in 
the Constitution’s mechanism of checks and balances among the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  As James Madison 
famously stated in The Federalist, “The structure of the Government 
must furnish the proper checks and balances between the different 
departments,” and must establish “subordinate distributions of 
power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several 
offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other.”50 
There are several overlapping objectives and purposes that 
congressional oversight ideally serves: 
• improving the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of 
governmental operations; 
• detecting and preventing poor administration, waste, 
abuse, arbitrary and capricious behavior, or illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct; 
• protecting civil liberties and constitutional rights; 
• inform the general public and ensure the executive policies 
reflect the public interest; 
• ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent; and 
• prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and 
prerogatives.51 
The draft version of this Article had argued Congress must find 
effective ways to hold the executive branch accountable for the 
delegated authority by balancing oversight and accountability—
achieving the objectives emphasized above—with practicality—
ensuring the executive branch complies with the requirements for 
receiving the TPA.  Part III.D illustrates the textual development of 
congressional oversight, which failed to translate into the effective 
implementation required in the 2002 Trade Act.  The TPA-2015 will 
be available to the incoming president with the inauguration 
scheduled in January 2017.  Accordingly, the new president and his 
 
 49  See L. ELAINE HALCHIN & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL797-936, 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 1, 2 (2012). 
 50   THE FEDERALIST NO.  51 (James Madison). 
 51  See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41079, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2010) (listing ideal objectives and purposes of 
congressional oversight) (emphasis added); HALCHIN & KAISER, supra note 49, at 2. 
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or her executive branch must work with Congress to adopt the new 
procedural requirements of the TPA-2015, to ensure the political 
compact stays effective and relevant in defining the U.S. trade policy 
for the next decade. 
B. Political Context of the 2002 Trade Act 
Although the primary focus of the 2002 Trade Act was not the 
procedural improvement of increasing congressional oversight 
provisions, congressional oversight remained vital to the discussion.  
When President George W. Bush sought to renew fast-track 
authority—which was renamed “Trade Promotion Authority”—
Congress recognized that if it were to grant the TPA, it must be 
coupled with proper congressional oversight, and “hold executive 
officials accountable for the implementation of delegated 
authority.”52  Such quid-pro-quo arrangement was necessary, as “the 
real power of TPA is the underlying political compact between 
Congress and the President rather than its statutory guarantees, 
which are technically quite fragile.”53  In crafting the TPA, Congress 
drafted the following provisions that can limit the use of the 
expedited procedures.  As shown below, they serve as important 
checks to the delegated authority, so Congress would not simply 
surrender its constitutional authority over trade-related matters, as 
it has seen in the past. 
C. The TPA under the 2002 Act: Expansion of Congressional 
Oversight – Was it Effective? 
The TPA under the 2002 Trade Act enhanced the congressional 
oversight provisions in two significant ways.  First, the legislation 
introduced the new requirement of executive-congressional 
consultations.  It strengthened congressional clout by requiring that 
a schedule and guidelines for consultations include the president 
sending notification and seeking consultation with Congress before 
beginning negotiations.54  It created a new Congressional Oversight 
Group (“COG”), a body tasked with leading consultations with the 
Administration and formulating the consultation guidelines.55  This 
 
 52  OLESZEK, supra note 51, at 1.  
 53  See Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as 
Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than a Name Change, 35 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). 
 54  H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., § 2107 (2d Sess., 2002) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3807 
(2006)). 
 55  Id. § 2104 (a)–(f) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3804 (2006)) (Most of the 
requirements for notification and consultation in the 2002 Trade Act are found in this 
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group is jointly led by the chairmen of the revenue committees, 
namely the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee, replacing the “congressional advisers” formerly 
introduced in the 1974 Trade Act.56 
Second, the new legislation provided more detailed 
requirements from the executive branch, especially the USTR, while 
negotiating directly with foreign governments: 
• the USTR must “consult closely and on a timely basis with, 
and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
Congressional Oversight Group;”  and 
• the USTR must identify domestic laws that would be 
affected by a trade agreement resulting from the 
negotiations to the COG.57 
Despite these progressive changes to the congressional 
oversight mechanisms, the degree of their implementation remains 
questionable at best.  While the 2002 Trade Act preserved most of 
the withdrawal mechanisms that had previously been in effect in the 
1974 Trade Act, which in theory, should have allowed Congress to 
deny fast-track treatment if the “president fails to comply with 
certain required procedural steps,” the political reality makes it 
extremely difficult for Congress to actually exercise these extreme 
provisions.58 
i. The GAO Report 
The 2007 Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) Report 
to the Senate Finance Committee accurately presents the need to 
improve the content and process of congressional and private sector 
consultations.59  The GAO Report showed that from August 2002 to 
April 2007, the USTR held 1,605 consultations with congressional 
committee staff.  Contrary to what one would expect from the high 
volume of consultation, the responses showed that satisfaction with 
 
section.).  
 56  DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 8.  
 57  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, About Us, http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us (last visited April 22, 2016).  H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., § 2102(d)(1) (2d Sess., 2002) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3802(d)(1) (2006)) (“Consultations with congressional 
advisers”). 
 58  HAL SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
21, at 25 (explaining that while the 2002 Trade Act provisions make fast-track an easily 
retractable mechanism from a technical standpoint, in practice, its efficacy derives from 
the underlying political compact between Congress and the president).  
 59  2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 41 n.60 (“Of 28 committee staffs (from 
seven committees of jurisdiction in each House, each with a majority and minority 
staff) that we contacted, we were able to secure interviews with individuals from 18.”).  
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input and influence was “mixed.”60 
1. Quality of Consultation 
Although the committee staff the GAO interviewed said that 
“USTR provided high-quality information that provided them with 
insight into the progress of the negotiations” and demonstrated 
“willingness to answer questions and follow up on particular issues 
of interest,” the staff felt that the USTR’s consultation meetings had 
not met their expectations “because they had not provided an 
opportunity for a two-way exchange of information that the staff 
considered a true consultation.”61  Some members of Congress, 
especially committee chairs of the trade advisory committee, have 
also expressed dissatisfaction with the executive branch’s execution 
of the trade negotiation and consultation process, which were 
required under the TPA in the 2002 Trade Act.62  In fact, more than 
half believed “the consultation did not provide the opportunity for 
meaningful input or influence into trade negotiations.”63 
2. Timeliness of Consultation 
With respect to the timing of the consultations, most, but not 
all, of the staff of the trade and agriculture committees said the 
timelines of consultations were good; however, staff from the other 
committees of jurisdiction often said that “the consultations were 
not timely.”64 
3. Shortcomings of the COG 
The COG, which was a new creation under the 2002 Trade Act, 
was not perceived as particularly successful, according to the 2007 
GAO Report.  The intention of the COG was to draw members of 
Congress into the consultation process, particularly members from 
non-trade committees, and to provide them with a private and 
confidential opportunity to have a consultative and advisory role in 
 
 60  See the 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 57.  
 61  The 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 43.   
 62  The 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 57 (reporting that some chairs 
expressed dissatisfaction with the feedback from the USTR, explaining that they 
thought the USTR was either biased against their committee or that their opinions were 
not truly valued or taken into consideration); see also, Inside Trade, “Grassley Presses 
USTR to Improve Consultations on FTAs,” WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Jul. 7, 2006); 2007 GAO 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.  
 63  See 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 5. 
 64  2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 44.  
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trade policy.65  According to the USTR consultation log, the “COG 
was convened only nine times before TPA lapsed in July 2007,” and 
worse yet, most staff outside of the trade and agriculture committees 
were unfamiliar with, or unaware of, the COG, and those staff who 
knew the COG “did not find it to be useful.”66 
There are two possible explanations for such dissatisfaction 
among congressional staff and committee members.  The first is that 
the TPA did not include enough oversight mechanisms in the text of 
the 2002 Trade Act.  The second, and the more likely reason based 
on the 2007 GAO Report, is that while the provisions were 
adequately written on paper, the problem lies in their 
implementation.  TPA-2015 attempts to address the first concern by 
including further oversight and consultation requirements in the 
Legislation.  The second concern, however, can only be addressed 
when the executive branch works with Congress, and is subject to 
future reviews.  Meanwhile, Part III.D explores how TPA-2015 has 
improved. 
D. TPA-2015: Improved Congressional Oversight, Consultations, 
and Access to Information 
TPA-2015 expands on the 2002 Trade Act’s efforts to secure 
greater congressional oversight mechanisms.  TPA-2015 provides 
more safeguards in various stages of the trade negotiations process, 
which require more from both the president and the executive 
branch.  Specifically, it attempts to expand access to information 
and requests greater accountability to supplement the meager 
consultations and coordination efforts that existed under the 2002 
Trade Act. 
TPA-2015’s emphasis on enhanced consultation requirements 
is clear from the language in its preamble.67  The preamble of the 
Bill, S. 995, in part, reads: “A BILL to establish congressional trade 
negotiating objectives and enhance consultation requirements for trade 
negotiations, to provide for consideration of trade agreements, and 
for other purposes.”68  Furthermore, the name of the Legislation 
added the word “accountability,” which shows Congress’s belief 
 
 65  2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 (citing a congressional staff familiar with 
the creation of the COG).  
 66  2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 46-47. 
 67  Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, A Dictionary of Law, OXFORDREFERENCE.COM 
(7th ed. 2014), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/ 
9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-2955?rskey=Br6pqc&result=3115 
(defining “preamble” as “The part of a statute that sets out its purposes and effects.”).  
 68  See H.R. 1890, S. 995, 114th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2015) (emphasis added).  
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that it is a crucial factor in gaining bipartisan support.69 
Among the eleven sections in TPA-2015, four sections are 
particularly noteworthy for their discussion of congressional 
oversight.  Section 4202 outlines “Trade agreements authority”; 
section 4203 provides for “Congressional oversight, consultations, 
and access to information”; section 4204 imposes increased 
“Notice, consultations, and reports”; and section 4205 lays out 
“Implementation of trade agreements.”70  I will discuss 
improvements to congressional involvement under each of these 
sections. 
i. Section 4202: Trade Agreements Authority71 
This section permits the president, subject to congressional 
notification requirements and certain limitations, to enter into trade 
agreements with foreign countries to modify duties or other import 
restrictions that unduly burden U.S. trade before July 1, 2018 (or 
July 1, 2021 if the trade authorities procedures are extended), and to 
make changes to duties the president determines to be required or 
appropriate to carry out such trade agreements.72  Importantly, this 
section gives teeth to the trade authorities procedures, as it 
establishes the process to gain an extension that the president must 
complete, as well as the procedure by which either house of 
Congress can deny the president’s request for an extension of the 
TPA authority.73  This procedure is a reminder to the executive 
branch that the availability of the expedited procedures is “a 
congressional prerogative” that can be withdrawn if Congress 
becomes dissatisfied with how the president has conducted trade 
agreement negotiations.74 
ii. Section 4203: Congressional Oversight, Consultations, 
and Access to Information75 
This section provides detailed requirements that the 
 
 69  Compare Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014, H.R. 3830, 113th 
Cong. § 1 (2014), with Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 
Act of 2015, H.R. 1890, 114 Cong. 1st Sess. §1 (2015).  
 70  19 U.S.C. § 4202 (2016); 19 U.S.C. § 4203 (2016); 19 U.S.C. § 4204 (2016); 
19 U.S.C. § 4205 (2016).   
 71  19 U.S.C. § 4202 (2016).  
 72  Id. § 4202(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 73  Id. § 4202 (a)(5)(A)-(D).  
 74  FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 14.  
 75  19 U.S.C. § 4203 (2016).  
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administration must follow in its consultations with Congress.76  It 
specifies that in the course of trade negotiations, the USTR shall: 
“meet upon request with any member of Congress”; provide access 
to pertinent documents, including classified materials, to any 
member of Congress who requests them; and engage in close and 
timely consultation with the Senate Finance Committee, the House 
Ways and Means Committee, the House and Senate Advisory 
Groups on Negotiations, all committees of the House and the 
Senate with jurisdiction over laws that could be affected by the trade 
agreement, and the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture 
concerning negotiations and agreements relating to agricultural 
trade.77 
Also, this section promotes enhanced coordination with 
Congress through the production of written guidelines by the USTR 
that require that office to share important information with 
concerned members of Congress and affected federal agencies.  The 
USTR must develop these guidelines in consultation with the 
chairmen and the ranking members of the House Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee respectively, within 
120 days after TPA-2015 is enacted, which was October 27, 2015.78  
In accordance with this requirement, the USTR produced  its 
“Guidelines for Consultation and Engagement.”79  Additionally, in 
the course of trade negotiations, the USTR must also consult closely 
and on a timely basis with these congressional advisers, keeping 
them “fully apprised of the measures a trading partner has taken to 
comply with those provisions of the agreement,” before their entry 
into force.80 
In terms of access to information, the greatest improvement 
under TPA-2015 is making the “pertinent documents” related to 
negotiations, including “classified information,” available to 
congressional staff, in addition to members of Congress, under the 
condition they receive proper security clearances as needed.81  In this 
regard, the USTR Consultation Guidelines specify that it will make 
U.S. text proposals and consolidated text available to the following 
 
 76  Id. § 4203(a)(1).  
 77  Id. § 4203(a)(1)(A)-(E).  
 78  Id. § 4203(a)(3)(A) (providing for written guidelines to promote enhanced 
coordination with Congress). 
 79  U.S.T.R., Guidelines for Consultation and Engagement (Oct. 27, 2015), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%20Guidelines%20for%20Consultation%20
and%20Engagement.pdf [hereinafter “USTR Consultation Guidelines”]. 
 80  Id. § 4203(a)(2) (2016).  
 81  Id. § 4203(a)(3)(B)(ii).  
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individuals: 
• all members of Congress; 
• relevant professional staff of the Committees on Finance 
and Ways and Means with an appropriate security 
clearance; 
• professional committee staff with an appropriate security 
clearance from other committees interested in reviewing 
text relevant to the committee’s jurisdiction; 
• any personal office staffer with an appropriate clearance of 
a member of the Committees on Finance and Ways and 
Means; and 
• any personal office staffer with an appropriate security 
clearance accompanying his or her Member of Congress.82 
iii. Section 4204: Notice, Consultations, and Reports83 
Notably, the notice requirement has become more rigorous 
under TPA-2015: the president is required to give at least ninety days 
notice before initiating negotiations with a country, in addition to 
providing written notice to Congress of the president’s intention to 
enter into the negotiations, the specific U.S. objectives for the 
negotiations with that country, and whether the president intends 
to seek an agreement or changes to an existing agreement.84  
Furthermore, the Legislation allows congressional advisory groups 
to compel meetings “upon the request of a majority of the members 
of either the House Advisory Group on Negotiations or the Senate 
Advisory Group on Negotiations” before initiating the negotiations 
or at any other time concerning the negotiations.85 
In light of the objective of promoting more transparency to the 
public, this section also added a requirement for the USTR to 
publish on its website “a detailed and comprehensive summary of 
the specific objectives with respect to the negotiations and a 
description of how the agreement, if successfully concluded, will 
further those objectives and benefit the United States” at least thirty 
days before initiating negotiations with a country upon consulting 
with the revenue committees.86  This section also added 
consultation requirements pertaining to trade in sensitive 
 
 82  USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 4-5.  
 83  19 U.S.C. § 4204 (2016).  
 84  19 U.S.C. § 4204(a)(1)(A) (2016).  
 85  Id. § 4204(c)(1). 
 86  Id. § 4204(a)(1)(D).  
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industries, such as fishing and textiles.87  The combination of these 
provisions enforces congressional oversight of the delegated powers 
to a greater degree than it had been in the past. 
iv. Section 4205: Implementation of Trade Agreements88 
To implement any agreement, the president, in addition to 
satisfying the notice and consultation requirement above, must do 
the following.  First, TPA-2015 adds another new requirement, that 
the full text of a completed trade agreement be made public at least 
sixty days before the president enters into the agreement on the 
USTR website, giving citizens “new and unprecedented access and 
knowledge . . . well before they are even submitted to Congress for 
approval.”89  Also, the president must submit to Congress a draft 
statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the 
agreement, and a copy of the final legal text of the agreement, at 
least thirty days before the president submits final documents after 
entering into an agreement.90  These layers of requirements ensure 
that the executive branch remains accountable to the public and to 
Congress throughout the implementation process. 
Finally, TPA-2015 explicitly places limitations on trade 
authorities procedures when Congress finds lack of notice or 
consultations.  The existence of this limitation should discourage 
any attempt by the executive branch to abuse the delegated 
authority.91  Moreover, this section includes an action under which 
the delegated authority can be withdrawn through “procedural 
disapproval resolution,” defined in section 4205 (b)(1)(B) of TPA-
2015 as follows: 
The term ‘procedural disapproval resolution’ means a resolution of either 
House of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
as follows: ‘That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult 
in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of 2015 on negotiations with respect to 
________________ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under 
that Act shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect 
to such trade agreement or agreements”, with the blank space being filled 
with a description of the trade agreement or agreements with respect to 
which the President is considered to have failed or refused to notify or 
 
 87  Id. § 4204(a)(2).  
 88  19 U.S.C. § 4205 (2016). 
 89  Sen. Orrin Hatch, Speech on the Senate floor (June 11, 2015), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-trade-promotion-authority-
enhances-congress-role-in-trade) (last visited April 22, 2016).  
 90  19 U.S.C. § 4205(a)(1)(D)(i)-(ii) (2016).  
 91  Id. § 4205(b).  
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consult.92 
The grounds for finding that the president has “failed or refused 
to notify or consult” in accordance with TPA-2015 are exhaustive 
and concrete.  Congress may exercise procedural disapproval if: 
• The president has failed or refused to consult in accordance 
with sections 4203 and 4204 and the requirements with 
respect to negotiations or agreements; 
• The consultation and transparency guidelines (under 
section 4203) have not been developed or met with respect 
to the negotiations or agreements; 
• The president has not met with the House or Senate 
Advisory Group on Negotiations when requested under 
section 4203(c)(4) with respect to the negotiations or 
agreements; or 
• The agreements fail to make progress in achieving the 
purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives expressed in 
TPA-2015.93 
These provisions are the “emergency brakes” available to 
Congress for lack of notice or consultations with respect to the trade 
agreements.  The definition of the procedural disapproval resolution 
language is strong, which indicates that Congress is willing to 
enforce its conditions in exchange for the TPA.  Thus, under the new 
Legislation, failure to comply with any of these requirements in the 
implementation procedure can cause the revocation of the TPA, or 
worse yet, the failure of a potentially long-negotiated trade 
agreement. 
v. Potential Concerns That May Arise From TPA-2015. 
In reality, the strengthened congressional oversight mechanism 
may face potential challenges in the following ways.  The first issue 
is related to granting every member of Congress, as well as her staff 
with proper security clearances, access to negotiating text.94  This 
provision requires careful consideration as to who should be able to 
access the negotiating text to ensure that the effective and timely 
negotiation of agreements is not hampered by the involvment of 
more officials than needed.  A side effect of that is ensuring 
confidentiality, which the USTR Guidelines list as an important 
matter to comply with certain legal requirements.95  This is 
 
 92  Id. § 4205(b)(1)(B)(i).  
 93  Id. § 4205(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV).  
 94  USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 4.  
 95  USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 10.  
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significant, as the over-engagement of Congress might impede or 
disincentivize the executive branch from meaningfully engaging 
Congress. 
Second, the Legislation calls for the establishment of a Chief 
Transparency Officer within the USTR’s office, who would be 
responsible for consulting with Congress on transparency policy, 
coordinating transparency in trade negotiations, engaging and 
assisting the public, and advising the USTR on transparency policy.96  
Again, historical accounts have shown the importance of 
transparency between the two branches, but the executive branch 
may view this as an uncomfortable, and worse yet, an unwelcome 
encroachment into its ability to negotiate.  Some may complain 
about the diminishing independence of agencies, a problem that 
hampers their ability to negotiate with the necessary degree of 
secrecy and autonomy.  The legislative and executive branches must 
balance their priorities and concerns to adhere to the procedural 
requirements under TPA-2015, centering on their common 
objective. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS REGARDING CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 
In previous Parts, this Article has examined the historical 
context and the progress of the congressional oversight mechanisms 
integrated with the TPA.  The significance of these developments 
becomes clearer when weighed against the potential administrative 
and constitutional ramifications when the TPA breaks down.  This 
Part argues that the conditions provided within TPA-2015 must be 
strictly enforced, because if they are not, the legal and political 
avenues available to Congress are arguably limited. 
Scholars have argued that the procedural safeguards built 
within the fast-track arrangement allow Congress to exercise 
considerable influence over the conduct of trade negotiations.97  
Unfortunately, these procedural safeguards may be as influential as 
the proponents of the TPA may claim, based on the previous 
practice of Congress and judicial decisions on legislative veto. 
To summarize, the TPA allows Congress to safeguard the 
delegated authority through three procedural means.98  First, 
Congress can threaten to withhold negotiating authority unless the 
 
 96  USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 1.  
 97  Eugenia da Conceicao-Heldt, NEGOTIATING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AT THE WTO: 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND BARGAINING DYNAMICS 53 (2011).  
 98  Id.  
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president accepts the conditions imposed by the legislature.  
Second, Congress can attempt to influence the negotiations while 
they are under way by threatening to disapprove any agreement that 
does not include aspects favorable to the views of Congress.  Finally, 
Congress ultimately would have a veto power—an up or down 
vote—over the trade agreement negotiated by the USTR.99  Under 
TPA-2015, the limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures have 
been strengthened, as explained in the previous Part. 
Political Disincentive to Vote “Down.”  This conclusion is 
supported by looking at Congress’s history with regard to trade 
agreements and judicial treatment of the legislative veto.  First, 
Congress’s history with regard to trade agreements reveals that there 
is no precedent where Congress actually voted down a trade 
agreement because either the House or the Senate were displeased 
with the consultation or negotiating processes.  Even if either house 
of Congress is unsatisfied with the president’s consultation and 
reporting performance, it would be extremely difficult to exercise 
congressional disapproval authority for two substantial reasons.  
First, many members of Congress, as elected representatives with 
political priorities that include creating jobs and expanding the 
American economy through trade, may not want to vote down a 
trade agreement if it has the strong prospect of increasing exports 
and boosting the American economy.100  Even those opposed to the 
TPA aspect of TPA-2015, including the Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, believe that free and 
fair trade is good for Americans.101  So a member of Congress’s 
disappointment with the consultation or negotiating processes used 
by the president is unlikely to override that member’s desire to 
support free trade.  Second, voting down a trade agreement will 
generate enormous strain in the diplomatic relations with the 
negotiating countries, especially given how long and arduous many 
of these negotiations can be.  Therefore, even if TPA procedurally 
guarantees a de facto veto power, its actual effectiveness is 
questionable.  And this political reality raises the question, what 
 
 99  Id.  
 100  U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Assessing the Record of America’s Trade Agreements 
(Nov. 16, 2015), available at https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/assessing-the-
record-america-s-trade-agreements (summarizing the historical impact of trade 
agreements on the U.S. economy).   
 101  Vicki Needham, Pelosi Comes out Against Fast Track Bill, THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/198297-pelosi-comes-out-against-fast-track-bill 
(last visited on May 5, 2015) (citing Pelosi, “We’re the party of free trade, fair trade, 
and we believe that the global economy is here to stay, and we’re part of it.”).  
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would ensue if the TPA’s consultative mechanisms fail? 
A. Evaluating the Efficacy of the TPA as an Ex-post Veto Power vis-
à-vis INS v. Chadha 
The withdrawal of expedited procedures in the TPA is a form of 
ex-post veto power available to Congress.  While this power appears 
to be significant, it is undermined by the legislative reality and its 
arguably weak legal legitimacy, judging by how the courts have 
treated legislative veto.  Procedurally, a Senate or House committee 
has the ability to reverse fast-track procedures if the president fails 
to meet the requirements for consultation with congressional 
committees.  In such a circumstance, fast-track procedures for 
implementing bilateral or multilateral trade agreements may be 
withdrawn. 
To proceed with the withdrawal in the House, a resolution of 
disapproval must be launched by the chair or by a member of the 
Ways and Means or Rules Committees.  If the process is initiated in 
the Senate, it has to be introduced by the Finance Committee.102  As 
gatekeeper committees, they are given the power to deny the TPA 
application to trade agreements.  Considering that the TPA is an 
exercise of the House and Senate’s rulemaking power, from the 
constitutional law perspective, it can be reversed at any time through 
unicameral annulment.103 
The existence of the ex-post veto power under the TPA should 
be considered in the context of Congress’s prior practice of 
legislative vetoes.  Historically, the possibility of legislative vetoes 
encouraged broad delegation of authority, as it gave room for 
Congress to reject agreements it disliked.104  Under the TPA, 
Congress is empowered by the ex post veto power, as one of the last-
resort reins on the executive branch. 
However, the constitutionality of the ex-post veto power under 
the TPA remains unclear, as the Supreme Court sounded the death 
knell for legislative vetoes in the landmark case, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha.105  Although the decision could 
have been based on the unique facts surrounding the particular 
legislative veto, Chief Justice Burger wrote a very broad decision that 
 
 102  Susanne Lohmann & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided Government and U.S. Trade 
Policy: Theory and Evidence, 48 INT’L ORG. 595, 620 (1994).  
 103  DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 5–7.  
 104  DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 5–7. 
 105  I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) [hereinafter Chadha].  
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may invalidate all legislative vetoes in federal statutes.106 
In Chadha, the Court declared unconstitutional a statutory 
provision that authorized either House of Congress to reverse 
decisions of the attorney general concerning whether or not to 
deport aliens.107  In that particular case, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) had ordered Mr. Jagdish Rai Chadha, 
an East Indian, who was born in Kenya and held a British passport, 
to be deported after an adjudicatory hearing.108  The attorney general 
had suspended that order, and the House of Representatives had 
reinstated it by vetoing the attorney general’s decision.109 
In its majority decision, the Court found that congressional 
procedural rules may be an exception to its holding, by noting that 
it might be permissible “to accomplish what has been attempted by 
one House of Congress in the case [where] action [is required] in 
conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s 
prescription for legislative action.”110  However, the Court also 
limited the circumstances to which the foregoing exception to the 
ban against legislative vetoes can be applied, as “narrow, explicit, 
and separately justified.”111  In this regard, it is unclear whether the 
withdrawal of expedited procedures under the TPA would satisfy 
such a narrow exception if Congress were to exercise what can 
essentially be interpreted as a legislative veto. 
Although Chadha was a case involving an adjudicatory 
decision, the Court quickly indicated that its decision deserves a 
wide application by affirming two decisions by the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, which had invalidated one and two-
house vetoes of agency rules, one of which is Consumer Energy 
Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory, a D.C. Circuit case 
decided per curiam.112 
 
 
 106  See Beth A. Honetschlager, Comment, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha: The Death Knell for the Legislative Veto? 69 Iowa L. Rev. 513, 514 (1984). 
 107  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 920; 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1976); Section 244(c)(1) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act provided, in part, “Upon application by any alien 
who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of 
this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such 
alien.” Id.  
 108  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 922. 
 109  Id. at 923-28. 
 110  Id. at 968.  
 111  Id. at 955.  
 112  Consumer Energy Council of Amer. v. Fed. Energy Regulation Commission, 673 
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff’d in Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy 
Council of Amer., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). 
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Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC.  In FERC, the D.C. 
Circuit invalidated the one-house veto when it was used to review a 
proposed Incremental Pricing Rule of the FERC.  A group 
representing residential customers supported FERC’s proposed rule 
that would shift natural gas price increases to industrial customers. 
The same day FERC issued the final rule, the Subcommittee on 
Energy and Power reported favorably on a resolution of disapproval, 
and the full committee did the same the next day.  On the 
constitutionality of the legislative veto, the D.C. Circuit stated: 
Indeed, it is ironic that Congressional amici attempt to place great 
significance on the Commission’s independence and on the need for 
having a politically accountable check on the agency’s decision. The 
fundamental justification for making agencies independent is that since they 
exercise adjudicatory powers requiring impartial exercise, political interference 
is undesirable (emphasis added).113 
Relevance of these Cases to the TPA Withdrawal Mechanism.  There 
is a caveat to analogizing the TPA’s ex-post veto power with these 
legislative veto cases.  Under the TPA, fast-track authority is 
delegated from Congress to the president, not to any independent 
executive agencies, as seen in Chadha and FERC.  Also, as examined 
in Part I, ex-post veto power under the TPA is a part of a political 
agreement between the executive branch and Congress.  This means 
it is a prescribed, predetermined contingency mechanism, which is 
different from the way Congress exercised its veto in Chadha or 
FERC.  However, despite such differences, the jurisprudence that 
heavily suggests that legislative vetoes are most likely all 
unconstitutional is significant in evaluating the efficacy of the 
congressional oversight mechanism embedded in the TPA. 
The implications of the Chadha decision and the subsequent 
FERC decision are substantial, as these cases switch the playing field 
for Congress.  In the words of Prof. Oona A. Hathaway, the Supreme 
Court arguably “pulled away this last strand” of congressional 
power over ex-ante congressional-executive agreements, with 
Chadha, leaving behind the delegations of congressional authority 
to the president without the potential of exercising its most 
powerful legislative procedure in TPA-2015.114  Prof. Hathaway 
observes, “when Congress responded to Chadha by simply removing 
the legislative vetoes, it left in place broad delegations that Congress 
never intended to leave unsupervised.”115  This potential for an 
 
 113  Id. at 472.  
   114   Oona Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 
YALE L.J. 140, 254 (2009).   
 115  Hathaway, supra note 114 at 254 (explaining how to rethink delegations of 
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imbalance of authority is also identified in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice White in the Chadha decision: 
Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice: 
either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself 
with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover 
endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the 
alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the executive branch 
and independent agencies.116 
The Court’s findings may be especially problematic when the 
TPA is viewed as a delegation that must be carefully supervised.  
Fueling this concern, the TPA is prone to the “Hobson’s choice” 
described by Justice White, in which Congress cannot simply 
“refrain from delegating the necessary authority” because once 
granted, the TPA could be delegated for a long period of time, until 
July 1, 2021, provided an extension disapproval resolution is not 
introduced and passed by either chamber by July 1, 2018.117  The 
question of how long fast-track authority can be given to the 
president without an adequate mechanism to oversee the effect of 
trade agreements was one of the major reasons for the congressional 
refusal to renew fast-track authority in the past.  For example, USTR 
Kantor faced a particularly difficult battle for congressional approval 
in the 1990s.118  During that time, the Senate Finance Committee 
was very concerned about the problem of procedural controls, 
although Congress mostly declined to grant fast-track authority on 
substantive grounds (i.e., labor standards and environmental 
provisions).119 
B. Viability of Judicial Review: No Alternative Under Political 
Question Doctrine 
In light of the potential unconstitutionality of the withdrawal 
procedures of the TPA, the rest of the congressional oversight 
mechanisms under the TPA, such as consultation and reports, are all 
the more crucial.  Barring all the domestic and diplomatic 
disincentives for Congress to actually exercise its ex-post veto power, 
Congress will not be able to make a claim to the Court against the 
executive branch, even if the president or his agents violate the 
procedural requirement, as trade negotiation would be deemed a 
 
lawmaking authority to the president).  
 116  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968. 
 117  FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 8.  
 118  Joyce Barrett, U.S. Trade Representative urges Fast-Track Extension, DAILY NEWS-
RECORD (May 18, 1995) available at https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
16884423.html.   
 119  See DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS, supra note 12, at 17–19. 
KIM FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2016  11:12 PM 
348 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
non-justiciable issue under the political question doctrine. 
Under the political question doctrine, a court will decline to 
rule on the merits if it finds that the underlying matter is committed 
to the discretion and expertise of the legislative and executive 
branches.  Most notably for the purposes of this Article, Made in the 
USA Foundation v. United States dealt with a challenge to the NAFTA, 
in which it was alleged that the failure to use the treaty process 
rendered the agreement and its implementing legislation 
unconstitutional.120  The court held that “ruling on the policy merits 
would require it to consider areas beyond its expertise.”121  In that 
case, the court noted that the Treaty Clause did not set forth 
circumstances under which its procedures must be followed when 
approving international commercial agreements, and that 
determining the “significance” of an international agreement would 
force the court to make “policy judgments of the sort unsuited for 
the judicial branch.”122 
Most applicable to the hypothetical situation here is the court’s 
discussion of the need for the nation to speak with uniformity in 
the area of foreign affairs and commerce.  In the court’s view, a 
judicial order declaring the NAFTA invalid “could have a profoundly 
negative effect on this nation’s economy and its ability to deal with 
other foreign powers”; the court emphasized that such an order 
would not only affect the validity of the NAFTA, but would 
“potentially undermine every other major international commercial 
agreement made over the [past half-century].”123  Importantly, the 
court expressed the need for the judicial branch to remain impartial 
when adjudicating between the Congress and the president.124 
In light of such strong deference provided to the president 
under the trade negotiating authority, and the political question 
doctrine generally, it remains questionable whether Congress can 
successfully seek a judicial remedy when it is unsatisfied with the 
executive branch’s adherence to the procedural requirements of the 
TPA. 
 
   120   Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2011).   
 121  Id. at 1314 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). 
 122  Id. at 1317.  See also, CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21004, TRADE 
PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
MAJOR VOTES, 6 (2011).  
 123  Made in the USA, 242 F.3d  at 1268, 1312, 1318. 
 124  Id. at 1268. 
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C. Going Forward: How to Evaluate TPA-2015 
With the enactment of TPA-2015, the president and Congress 
will test whether the enhanced oversight mechanisms effectively 
achieve accountability and transparency, while trying to avoid the 
pitfalls that occurred during the implementation of the 2002 Trade 
Act.  Though it is difficult to predict the effectiveness of the new 
measures, with various mercurial factors such as presidential 
transition and progress on negotiations involved, the TPA can, and 
should be assessed on its procedural value of greater inter-branch 
cooperation.  Such an assessment would consider “the duration, the 
scope, the precision of the negotiating direction given to the 
president, and the mechanisms for withholding fast-track treatment 
from a particular agreement.”125 
Prof. Hal Shapiro and Lael Brainard have introduced two 
alternative forms of the TPA, which are beneficial in contemplating 
both potential advantages and disadvantages of each model.  On 
one end of the spectrum, they present a notion of making each grant 
of authority “specific to the negotiation of a particular agreement 
and the duration coterminous with the length of the negotiation,” 
or a case-by-case TPA.126  The advantage of a case-by-case TPA is that 
it would permit much more precision in the negotiating objectives, 
and allow Congress to confine debate to the potential merits of a 
particular trade agreement.  In the current context, Congress could 
grant the TPA for the negotiation with the E.U. in TTIP, but refuse it 
for implementing the TPP.  The problem with this approach, 
however, is that it may prove overly restrictive, unintentionally 
signaling to international counterparts that the president does not 
have the authority to enter into any negotiations until after 
congressional approval has been obtained.127  However, with such a 
variety of trade agreements on the table, future Congresses may find 
this to be an ideal option to ensure its involvement in the 
negotiating process without being bound to the binary “up-or-
down” vote. 
The opposite approach is Congress establishing fast-track 
procedural mechanisms “for a longer duration or even indefinitely, 
but requiring an additional hurdle for the application of the 
 
 125  Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Fast Track Promotion Authority, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Dec. 1, 2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
papers/2001/12/globaleconomics-brainard. 
   126    Id.  
 127  Id.  
KIM FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2016  11:12 PM 
350 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
procedures to a particular agreement.”128 I call this option a 
proportional TPA.  According to Shapiro and Brainard, the president 
would be pushed to “consult Congress at the start of (or early in) 
negotiations, and it would permit Congress to establish more 
specific negotiating objectives for each agreement than is possible 
in previous fast-track legislation.”129  The advantage in this model is 
that if the TPA is granted, Congress could further specify whether 
the application to a specific agreement would require a vote by only 
the gatekeeper committees or a more difficult floor action, and 
whether it would require a vote of approval or the easier standard 
of withstanding possible congressional disapproval. 
Shapiro and Brainard additionally suggest that the “degree of 
congressional oversight afforded by the hurdle for application to 
particular trade negotiations could be made directly proportional to 
the overarching authority granted to the President by Congress.”130  
In other words, this proportional approach can potentially allow the 
longer and broader trade negotiations to receive more oversight.  
Although this appears to be a convincing solution in theory, the 
trade agreements currently being negotiated can all make a 
meritorious claim, to a degree, of their significance in the 
international trading system.  More importantly, it can defeat the 
entire advantage of expedience in curtailing the legislative process, 
which may eliminate the political incentive of the president to seek 
the TPA. 
Prof. Hathaway’s recommendation precisely addresses these 
administrative and political concerns.  She suggests that if Congress 
authorizes the TPA on a periodic basis, it could better ensure that 
the authority is not abused.131  A president who uses the authority 
in ways that are regarded by Congress as abusive would see the 
authority disappear shortly thereafter.  In her view, that potential 
withdrawal would provide an incentive for the president to 
communicate effectively with Congress and to use the fast-track 
authority in a responsible and judicious manner.132 
While the periodic review is one way of ensuring the 
congressional delegation does not go unaccounted for, the 2007 
GAO Report shows that absent proper cooperation, the most 
 
 128  Id.  
 129  Id.  
 130  Id.  
 131  Hathaway, supra note 114, at 265 (discussing advantageous aspects of adopting 
a fast track process for trade negotiations). 
 132  Hathaway, supra note 114, at 264. 
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comprehensive consultation and monitoring requirements can be 
futile.  Many interviewed political staff did not even know what the 
COG was, nor what role it was supposed to carry out.  If the political 
and legal concerns of the TPA are not hashed out through more 
comprehensive and workable congressional oversight mechanisms, 
Congress may have decreasing leverage in including terms for its 
desired level of involvement in the future. 
This observation circles back to the reality that the difficulty lies 
in the implementation phase, and Congress must reinforce adhering 
to statutory representation requirements without disincentivizing 
the executive branch from meaningfully engaging with Congress.  It 
is an important means for Congress to “not only keep tabs on the 
negotiations through the President, but also to be present and active 
in negotiations.”133  With this in mind, Congress must decide 
whether the current form of the TPA satisfies its legislative objectives 
during the next five years.  Another non-legal avenue Congress may 
pursue in motivating executive compliance would be mobilizing 
constituents to urge the executive for more transparency and greater 
involvement of Congress through the TPA mechanism.  As 
examined above, TPA-2015 includes the unprecedented notice to 
the public requirement even before seeking congressional approval 
of the negotiated text.  Given the precarious political nature of the 
TPA, the president and his executive agencies will improve 
information access and the timeliness of congressional 
consultations, if there are political pressures for them to make this 
available. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the congressional oversight mechanisms 
of the Trade Promotion Authority, from its creation to the most 
recent version contained in TPA-2015.  It first introduced the 
evolution of fast-track authority and examined how this 
congressional-executive agreement is a unique creation of the 
United States.  As seen through various trade legislation, the power 
struggle between the executive branch and Congress necessitates 
 
 133  Laure L. Wright, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for the Twenty-First Century?, 
12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 979, 1003 (2004); see also, Christopher S. Rugaber, Trade 
Policy: Baucus, Other Senators Press Zoellick on Trade Consultation Issues, 19 INT’L TRADE 
REP. 1901, 1901 (2002) (stating that “designated congressional trade advisers and their 
staff should be able to attend and observe trade negotiations, and . . . should have 
access to negotiating documents, with sufficient opportunity to comment on them . . . . 
[T]here should be enough time for reasonable congressional suggestions to be 
incorporated into U.S. negotiating positions.”).  
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clear procedures and congressional oversight mechanisms that will 
ensure that Congress’s delegated authority does not end in the 
executive branch’s unfettered authority without proper consultative 
process.  Congress has continued to expand and clarify the oversight 
mechanism that mandates executive-congressional consultation, as 
demonstrated by the Trade Act of 2002 and after a long hiatus, it 
was revived and strengthened in TPA-2015. 
The importance of a proper consultation mechanism is 
especially heightened given the unwillingness of some members of 
Congress to vote down trade deals and the doubtful 
constitutionality of the ex-post veto power of Congress.  With such 
meager political and judicial recourse available, Congress must 
remain vigilant and ensure proper balance between itself and the 
executive branch.  The executive branch also has greater 
responsibility under TPA-2015, in notifying, briefing, and 
consulting various stakeholders in the public and private spheres.  
This can be achieved when both the executive branch and Congress 
dedicate themselves to adhering to the procedural aspect of the TPA 
and engage in a frank dialogue in a timely manner. 
As it stands currently, the efficacy of TPA-2015 remains 
undetermined, but the USTR’s release of the Consultation 
Guidelines is a good start.  Crucially, TPA-2015’s effectiveness and 
relevance will be evaluated based on how the next president sets the 
trade negotiating objectives and strategies, which in turn, will 
determine how the president exercises the TPA.  Considering the 
significance of pending PTAs, such as the TPP and the TTIP, 
Congress must maximize its role in congressional oversight to make 
certain that the direction of the executive branch remains in line 
with the general will of Congress.  As President Nixon stated in his 
speech in 1973, trade policy is a field that requires significant 
collaboration between the two branches of the government.  Almost 
half a century later, his words still ring true, and such inter-branch 
cooperation remains an important goal for the 114th Congress, 
President Obama, and his successor, for the determination of future 
U.S. trade policy. 
 
